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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how technology transfer within U.S. multinational firms changes in response
to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 16 countries over the 1982-1999 period.  Analysis of
detailed firm-level data reveals that royalty payments for technology transferred to affiliates increase
at  the  time  of  reforms,  as  do  affiliate  R&D  expenditures  and  total  levels  of  foreign  patent
applications.  Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are concentrated among affiliates
of parent companies that use U.S. patents extensively prior to reform and are therefore expected to
value IPR reform most.  For this set of affiliates, increases in royalty payments exceed 30 percent.
Our results collectively imply that U.S. multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes abroad by
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1. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, there has been a global trend toward stronger 
intellectual property rights (IPR).
1  By the mid-1990s, a minimum global standard for 
intellectual property rights had been enshrined in the WTO Charter through the 
incorporation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  
The shift in international economic policy making from its traditional postwar focus on 
the lowering of tariff and nontariff trade barriers to the embrace of strong IPR is deeply 
controversial.  Lanjouw (1997) and McCalman (2001), among others, have argued that 
the move toward stronger IPR in developing countries may work against national 
economic interests, transferring rents to multinational corporate patent holders 
headquartered in the world’s most advanced countries, especially the United States.  IPR 
advocates counter that strengthening IPR will induce more innovation in the global 
economy, thereby fostering more rapid economic growth.
2  Furthermore, these advocates 
claim that even if the additional innovation is mostly concentrated in advanced countries, 
a strengthening of IPR will accelerate the transfer of technology between countries, 
ensuring that all countries benefit.   
In this paper we attempt to assess this latter claim.  We use affiliate-level data on 
U.S. multinational firms and aggregate patent data to test if legal reforms that strengthen 
IPR increase the transfer of technology to multinational affiliates operating in reforming 
countries.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number of countries undertook substantial 
reforms of their patent systems.  We find that royalty payments for the use or sale of 
                                                 
1   Maskus (2000) provides an extremely useful summary of this policy history. 
2  Theoretical work by Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Glass and Saggi (2002), and Grossman and Lai (2005) 
demonstrates that this may not occur.  The ultimate impact of stronger IPR on the global rate of innovation 
depends very much on how multinational firms respond to it.    2
intangible assets made by affiliates to parent firms, which capture the value of technology 
transfer, increase in the wake of strengthened patent regimes.  This increase is 
concentrated among the affiliates of firms that make extensive use of U.S. patents prior to 
reform and is more than 30 percent for this subsample. 
The interpretation that IPR reform results in an increase in technology transfer 
among U.S. multinationals is strengthened by the fact that R&D spending by affiliates – 
usually viewed as a complement to technology imports from the parent – increases after 
IPR reform.  Both the level and growth rate of non-resident patenting also increase in the 
post reform period, and these changes provide additional indications that at least one 
component of the observable increase in licensing flows is associated with the 
introduction of new technology following patent reform.  Consistent with earlier work, 
we find no corresponding reaction in resident patent filings.  Collectively, our results 
provide evidence that improvements in IPR result in real increases in technology transfer 
within multinational enterprises. 
Existing empirical work that analyzes the impact of IPR reforms has a number of 
shortcomings.  Many studies consider reactions to specific changes in the IPR regime of a 
single country, which raises concerns about whether their results generalize.  In addition, 
these studies focus on the impact of stronger IPR on domestic innovation, omitting 
analysis of technology transfer.
3  Lerner (2002a, 2002b) analyzes changes in patenting 
activity of foreign and domestic issuers following patent reforms in sixty countries over a 
150 year period.  He finds an increase in patenting activity among foreigners, which is 
                                                 
3   Evidence on the impact of stronger IPR on domestic innovation is mixed.  Scherer and Weisburst (1995), 
Bessen and Maskin (2000), Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), and Lerner (2002a, 2002b) find no positive 
impact, while Evenson and Kumar (2001) and Chen and Puttitanum (2005) do find such an effect.    3
suggestive of increased technology transfer, but he does not directly examine technology 
transfer, nor does he study the heterogeneity of responses across firms.   
Other empirical work has tried to identify the effects of IPR reform by analyzing 
the cross-sectional relationship between IPR and measures of international trade and 
investment at the country or regional level, finding a strong positive effect of IPR on 
trade, but a less clear effect of IPR on FDI.
4  However, the measures of IPR utilized do 
not generally take into account the effectiveness of enforcement, they are highly 
correlated with other important country characteristics, and they have limited time-series 
variation.  Since FDI data are typically not disaggregated, even by industry, it has also 
not been possible to look at the impact of IPR reform on the composition of multinational 
activity.
5  Furthermore, much of this literature addresses the crucial issue of the impact on 
technology transfer only indirectly, if at all.
 6 
  In our examination of the impact of stronger IPR on international technology 
transfer within multinational firms, we are able to bring to bear considerably richer data 
than has been used by prior researchers.  Firm and affiliate-level data for multinationals 
operating in multiple countries allow us to deal more effectively with issues of causality 
and identification.  As a consequence, we are able to offer the strongest evidence to date 
                                                 
4 For example, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) found a strong positive effect of IPR on imports, and Smith 
(1999, 2001) reports results that are consistent with a role for IPR in encouraging U.S. exports.  In looking 
at the effect of IPR on FDI, Maskus and Eby-Konan (1994) find no effect; Maskus (1998), however, points 
out that studies that consider FDI in isolation may not be conclusive because investment is only one part of 
the broader set of decisions that a multinational firm makes in entering a market.  He reports regressions 
that are consistent with a positive effect of IPR on FDI, but only for more developed countries.  Yang and 
Maskus (2001) examine the impact of IPR on technology licensing. 
5  One recent exception is Javorcik (2004), who examines the composition of FDI in Eastern Europe in the 
1990s and relates this composition to differences across countries in IPR regimes.  Because this study 
focuses on a small number of countries in a single region of the developing world, natural questions arise 
about the extent to which these findings can be generalized outside the regional context. 
6   Much of the recent literature on international technology diffusion, reviewed in Keller (2004), ignores 
the potential impact of changes in intellectual property rights on knowledge spillovers.     4
for the proposition that stronger IPR enhances at least one kind of international 
technology transfer.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 puts forth the hypotheses 
we test and our empirical specifications.  Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 
discusses the results.  Section 5 concludes with a brief explanation of the implications of 
our results for the ongoing international policy debate as well as the economic literature. 
2. Intellectual Property Rights and Technology Transfer 
One of the potential benefits of strengthening intellectual property rights is that 
such protections may induce foreign firms to produce and sell technologically advanced 
goods in the reforming country.  Surveys of multinational managers suggest that 
technology transfer within multinational firms is sensitive to the perceived strength of 
IPR protection.
7  When a firm transfers sensitive technology to an affiliate, it generally 
has to instruct local engineers and other local skilled workers concerning key elements of 
its technology.  Some of these elements may have been deliberately withheld from the 
firm’s patents, in the U.S. and in the foreign country, in order to prevent other parties 
from being able to copy its technology simply by reading its patents.  When it transfers 
this knowledge to local employees, there is a risk that these employees will defect to a 
local manufacturer, taking sensitive technology with them.  These employees are able to 
                                                 
7   We note, among other studies, the survey research of Lee and Mansfield (1996) in which a large sample 
of U.S. multinationals identified countries to which they would not transfer their latest, most useful 
technologies, even if the transfer was done within the firm.  In the same study, managers made it clear that 
they generally sought to avoid the transfer of strategically sensitive technology to unaffiliated parties, 
regardless of the perceived strength of the IPR regime.  The reluctance to license strategically sensitive 
technology outside the firm has been confirmed in our own conversations with multinational managers.    5
combine the patented and unpatented elements of the firms’ technology, effectively 
competing with it in the local market.
8   
In a weak IPR environment, the multinational firm has little recourse.   In the 
context of a stronger IPR environment with good patent protection, the firm can prevent 
the infringing firm from using the patented components of its technology.  In addition, a 
number of the patent reforms examined below explicitly included new protection of trade 
secrets or strengthened existing protection.   
Basic intuition suggests that if IPR regime shifts have a material impact on true 
intellectual property protection, then there should be an increase in the value of 
technology flows from parents to affiliates following regime changes.  It is possible to 
test for this effect using regressions of the form: 
(1)   
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where l indexes the individual affiliate, i the affiliate’s parent firm, j the affiliate’s host 
country, and t the year.  The dependent variable measures the volume of intrafirm royalty 
payments for intangible assets – our proxy for technology transfer.  The key variable of 
interest is Rjt, the post reform dummy variable, equal to one in the year of and years 
following patent reform in country j.  The specification contains a number of controls 
including time-invariant fixed effects for the parent-affiliate pair ( il α ), year fixed effects 
                                                 
8   There are many anecdotes that illustrate this point.  For example, in late 2003, the world’s leading 
contract semiconductor manufacturing firm, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), charged 
mainland Chinese rival Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) with theft of its 
intellectual property.  According to public statements by TSMC representatives, SMIC hired away more 
than one hundred TSMC employees, who brought with them valuable trade secrets.  SMIC was later sued 
for infringing multiple TSMC patents.  Conversations with parties familiar with this lawsuit confirmed that 
TSMC had not transferred its most advanced technology to its mainland Chinese operations, in anticipation 
of the possibility of such an outcome.      6
for the entire sample ( t α ), and a vector of country-specific time trends (yjt).
9  Pit, Hjt, and 
Ailt are vectors of time-varying parent, host country, and affiliate characteristics 
respectively.  Pit includes measures of parent firm sales and R&D investment.  Hjt 
includes measures of income per capita, trade and FDI openness, corporate income tax 
rates, and withholding tax rates.   
  If any observed increase in the value of technology flows from parent firms to 
affiliates results from improved IPR protection (and not, for example, from correlated 
reforms), the effect should be largest for firms that value patent protection the most.  In 
order to study the differential effects of patent reforms across firms, affiliates are split 
into two groups according to the extent to which their parents use U.S. patents prior to the 
reform.  Affiliates of parents that, over the four years prior to a particular reform, average 
at least as many U.S. patent applications as the parent of the median affiliate in the 
reforming country over the same period are assigned a high patent use dummy, Patil, 
equal to one.  For other affiliates that have parents that can be matched to the NBER 
patent database, Patil equals zero.
10  This dummy variable is interacted with the post 
reform dummy variable to assess the differential effect of reform on the affiliates of high 
patent parents.  
Changes in the value of licensing payments could reflect changes in the volume of 
technology transferred or merely changes in the price charged for that technology.  
Analyzing changes in the R&D expenditures of affiliates is helpful in distinguishing 
                                                 
9 The parent-affiliate pair fixed effect is generally indistinguishable from an affiliate fixed effect, except in 
the few cases where an affiliate moved from one parent system to another through mergers or acquisitions.  
Because an affiliate that has undergone such a move has access to a different portfolio of technologies, we 
treat it as a different entity.   
10 Alternative ways of specifying Patil yield similar results.  A four year window is used in these 
calculations because the sample begins in 1982 and the first reform occurs in 1986.    7
between these two possibilities.  There is a considerable body of work that details the 
relationship between affiliate and parent-firm R&D.
11  U.S.-based multinationals do 
undertake some basic and applied research abroad.  However, this is concentrated in the 
most advanced countries where the local scientific and engineering community is highly 
accomplished and the infrastructure for frontier research is well-developed.  R&D 
conducted by affiliates in less developed countries, which account for almost all of the 
countries in our sample, is focused on the absorption of parent firm technology and on its 
modification for local markets.
12  The literature review presented in Kuemmerle (1999) 
lists a number of studies that provide evidence that the co-location of R&D with foreign 
manufacturing facilitates the “transfer of knowledge and prototypes from the firm’s home 
location to actual manufacturing.” Affiliate R&D and technology transfer from the parent 
may thus be considered complements, so that IPR reform should also generate an 
increase in R&D spending.  To test if this is the case, we use variations of specification 
(1) that employ measures of the level of R&D spending conducted by individual affiliates 
as dependent variables. 
If multinationals do change the volume of technology transferred in a sustained 
manner and if these changes are a consequence of stronger IPR, then this should also be 
                                                 
11   For an early study on this topic, see Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979).  Kuemmerle (1999) provides 
a survey of the literature as of 1999. 
12   Our patent data allow us to identify where inventions for which U.S. patent protection is sought were 
generated.  We can thus get a rough sense of the extent to which R&D in affiliates based in our sample of 
countries was devoted to modification of existing products (which would produce few patents) as opposed 
to research designed to advance the technological frontier (which would produce many patents).  We find 
that the ratio of R&D spending to U.S. patents produced for foreign affiliates in countries other than Japan 
(a highly advanced country) is 8.4 times higher than the ratio for the domestic R&D operations of the 
parent firm.  This strongly suggests that the nature of R&D at home and abroad is qualitatively very 
different and confirms that the characterization of affiliate R&D activity in the literature holds for our 
sample firms.  We also note that the results on affiliate R&D in Table IV are robust to dropping Japan from 
the sample of reforming countries.    8
reflected in the data on foreign patenting in reforming countries.
13  A foreign 
multinational has little incentive to incur the costs of preparing and filing patent 
applications in a country where patent law or enforcement is weak – and firms anticipate 
this.  After IPR reform, multinationals may have an incentive to file patents primarily for 
the technologies already employed in the country.
14  This would imply that reform would 
only generate a temporary increase in foreign patent filing that falls off as firms 
completed protecting the portfolio of technologies used prior to reform.  However, if 
reforms induce multinationals to transfer new technologies into the country on an 
ongoing basis, both the level and growth rate of foreign patenting should increase after 
reform.  Specifications that test these predictions take the form: 
(2)  00 1 2 3 * jt j t jt jt jt jt jt jt Patent y H R R T α ααβ β β β ε =+++ + + + + 
The dependent variable measures the number of patents filed by domestic or foreign 
applicants in country j in year t.  We estimate (2) separately for domestic and foreign 
patenting in the countries that underwent IPR reform.  Patent applications in year t are a 
function of country ( j α ) and year ( t α ) fixed effects, a vector of country-specific time 
trends (yjt), as well as host country characteristics (Hjt).  This specification yields 
estimates of the effect of reform on both the level of patenting and its growth rate, which 
is captured by the coefficient on the interaction term of the reform dummy and a time 
trend that is equal to the number of years that have passed relative to the reform year (Tjt).   
3. Data Sources 
3.1 Data from BEA Surveys 
                                                 
13   In an influential paper, Eaton and Kortum (1996) use international patenting data to measure 
international technology transfer. 
14   International patenting rules generally require applicants to file patent applications in all countries in 
which protection will be sought within one year of filing an application in any country.  However, some of 
the patent reforms we study allowed for exceptions to this rule.    9
Annual data on U.S. multinational firms over the 1982-1999 period come from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
and the Balance of Payments Survey.
15  In addition to reporting extensive information on 
measures of parent and affiliate operating activity including R&D expenditures, 
multinationals must also report the value of royalties paid by affiliates to parents for the 
sale or use of intangible property.  Royalty payments are reported at the affiliate level, 
and they include payment for industrial products and processes, which capture 
technology licensing fees, as well as franchise fees, fees for the use of trademarks, and 
payments for other intangibles.  In 1989, the BEA collected data on technology licensing 
fees specifically.  In that year, the value of technology licensing fees accounted for more 
than 88 percent of total royalty payments, indicating that it is appropriate to use aggregate 
royalty payments as a proxy for the value of technology transfers.
16   
One concern with the use of royalty payments to proxy for the transfer of 
technology worth noting is that it only captures the value of transfers that firms report.  If 
firms have discretion with respect to reporting when IPR is weak, any observed increases 
in royalties could merely reflect increases in the extent to which firms report technology 
transfers at the time of patent reform.  There are three main reasons such changes in 
reporting are unlikely to affect our results. 
                                                 
15 The forms that firms are required to complete vary depending on the year, size of the affiliate, and U.S. 
parent’s ownership stake.  The most extensive data are collected in benchmark years – 1982, 1989, 1994, 
1999.  BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when 
only certain affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  To avoid working with estimated 
data, only affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular analysis are 
considered in this paper.  Additional information on the BEA data can be found in Mataloni (1995). 
16 It is important to note that our methodology does not require that the recorded intrafirm technology 
transfers be a full, complete accounting of the value of technology, broadly defined, that is provided by the 
parent to the affiliate.  Recall that we are basing our identification on changes over time for individual 
affiliates.  It is only necessary that the recorded numbers be roughly proportional to actual transfers, and 
that the factor of proportionality not change at the time of patent reform.    10
First, Section 482 of the U.S. tax code and similar legislation in countries abroad 
require U.S. multinationals to make royalty payments for the transfer of technology and 
impose constraints on how transfers are valued.  These laws generally demand that firms 
ascribe a value to transfers that would be realized in an arm’s-length setting, and U.S. and 
foreign governments have opposing incentives to ensure that royalties are not set at rates 
that are excessively high or low. 
Second, U.S. multinationals typically transfer similar technology to different parts 
of the world, and they charge the same royalties for transfers going to different locations, 
irrespective of the strength of patent law, to avoid IRS scrutiny.  In most multinationals, 
transfers of technology and the royalty payments they trigger are centrally managed, and 
parent firms keep careful internal records in order to track how their technology is being 
deployed around the world.  Audits by tax authorities are common, and if a U.S. audit is 
undertaken, the IRS carefully examines any cases in which a firm receives royalty flows 
that imply that similar transfers receive distinct reporting treatment in different countries.  
To avoid such scrutiny, firms generally apply the same royalty charges for transfers 
regardless of where the transfers occur.
17   
Finally, to the extent firms do have discretion in reporting royalties, tax 
considerations would factor prominently in reporting decisions, and these considerations 
would not necessarily encourage firms to report lower royalties before reform.  To avoid 
tax payments, multinationals prefer to report profits in low tax jurisdictions.  Parent 
companies therefore have the incentive to set low royalty rates for transfers to low tax 
countries.  However, they also have the incentive to set high royalty rates for transfers to 
                                                 
17 We thank accountants at the Big Four accounting firms for providing us with a detailed understanding of 
the accounting treatment of royalties and technology transfers.    11
high tax jurisdictions, thereby shifting profits back to the relatively low-taxed U.S. 
parent.  Hines (1995), Grubert (1998), and Collins and Shakelford (1998) present 
evidence that firms respond to the tax incentives to keep royalties off the books in low tax 
jurisdictions by adjusting their real activity or their reporting.  These papers indicate that 
host country income tax rates and withholding tax rates can be used to control for the 
effects of tax incentives on reported intrafirm royalties; we use these tax variables as 
controls in our econometric specifications.  In addition, robustness tests described in 
Section 4.1 provide evidence against the hypothesis that increases in royalties around the 
time of patent reform are focused in low tax countries where the incentives to under 
report prior to reform are strongest. 
The use of reported R&D expenditures from different countries also raises some 
important issues.  Although data on R&D expenditures from firms based in different 
countries are subject to concerns about comparability, the BEA survey requires all 
affiliates, regardless of location, to account for R&D expenditures in the same way.  The 
definition of R&D used in these surveys, based on FASB guidelines, has not 
substantively changed over the course of our sample period.  A second issue is that 
scientific and engineering labor costs or other factor prices might differ across countries, 
and these differences might distort international comparisons of the level of R&D 
expenditure at a point in time.  Our analysis below examines changes over time in 
affiliate R&D spending in the aftermath of IPR reform, controlling for country and year 
fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.  Since factor price differentials 
typically evolve slowly over time, it is unlikely that our results merely capture a sharp 
contemporaneous movement in the local price of R&D inputs.    12
3.2 Data from Other Sources 
A number of other databases are used to augment the information on U.S. firms in 
the BEA data.  In order to obtain information on parent firm R&D expenditures in years 
in which this item was not captured in BEA surveys, the BEA data on publicly traded 
parents are linked to COMPUSTAT using employee identification numbers.  To 
characterize the extent to which firms use the U.S. patent system, parent firm data are 
also linked to data on patenting activity captured in the NBER patent citation database.
18   
This comprehensive database covers all patents granted by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (U.S. PTO) throughout the 1982-1999 sample period.  Data on patent 
filings in the countries that undergo patent reform provide additional information on the 
level of technology being transferred.  Data on patent applications, broken out for foreign 
and domestic applicants over the 1982-1999 period, are primarily drawn from the World 
Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO).
19   
We also utilize host country controls from a variety of sources.  Corporate tax 
rates and withholding tax rates are imputed from the BEA data.
20  Measures of inward 
FDI restrictions are taken from Brune (2004), and measures of capital controls come from 
                                                 
18 This data set is documented in Hall et. al. (2001). 
19 Eaton, Kortum, and Lerner (2003) point out that these data may double count some non-resident patent 
applications.  To correct for this, WIPO data from 1991 forward are replaced with the data used in Eaton et 
al. for the sample of countries covered in that paper.  We thank Sam Kortum for these data.  In addition, we 
use data drawn from the OECD’s Basic Science and Technology Statistics for all years for OECD countries 
not covered by Eaton et al. and for the years prior to 1991 for countries in the Eaton et al. sample.   
20 Corporate tax rates are calculated from BEA data by taking the ratio of foreign income taxes paid to 
foreign pretax income for each affiliate, and using the medians of these rates as country-level observations 
for each country and year.  Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating 
country tax rates.  Withholding tax rates are calculated by taking the ratio of withholding taxes paid to 
royalty payments made for each affiliate, and using medians of these rates as country-level observations for 
each country and year.    13
Shatz (2000).
21  The trade openness index is drawn from Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2002) and GDP per capita from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2003). 
Table I displays descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis that follows 
for the benchmark survey years as well as for the entire 1982-1999 period.
22  The sample 
only includes firms in countries that undertook the IPR regime changes described below.  
In the most recent benchmark year, 1999, the sample includes more than 5,000 affiliates 
of more than 1,000 parent companies. 
3.3 Patent Reforms   
Details of the sample construction, including descriptions of our discussions with 
local patent experts in reforming countries, can be found in the Appendix associated with 
this paper, which is available online.
23  We provide an abbreviated discussion here in the 
interests of space.  We began by constructing as exhaustive a list as possible of patent 
reforms over the 1982-1999 sample period.  This initial list drew upon the reforms 
identified by Maskus (2000) and Qian (2004), as well as countries for which the widely 
used Ginarte and Park (1997) index of the strength of patent protection showed a 
significant change.
24  These sources identified an initial list of 42 nations.   
Unfortunately, data limitations sharply constrain the number of reform episodes 
we can examine using our empirical methodology.  We require both pre- and post reform 
data, and since our affiliate-level data are only available for the period 1982-1999, 
reforms that fall outside this window must be omitted.  We also distinguish the responses 
                                                 
21 The Brune (2004) measure is drawn from the 2001 version of the index she creates.  Host Country 
Capital Controls is a dummy equal to one when Shatz (2000) classifies openness with respect to both 
capital and profit remittances at less than 3. 
22 Since the size reporting requirements are higher in nonbenchmark years than in benchmark years, means 
and standard deviations of variables like affiliate sales are larger for the full sample than for each of the 
benchmark years. 
23   Please see http:/ www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/lbranstetter/research/tech_transfer_appendix.   
24 We thank Walter Park for providing us with an update to the data used in his paper.    14
of affiliates to IPR reform based on the extent to which their parent firms make use of the 
U.S. patent system.  In order to ensure that such a comparison is meaningful in each 
reform we examine, we required that there be at least 20 affiliates in manufacturing that 
report before and after a reform and that can be linked to the patenting entities in the 
NBER patent citation database.   
These data restrictions excluded all but 18 countries.  Extremely poor countries 
like Ghana, small economies like Iceland, and formerly communist countries like Russia 
failed to attract sufficient U.S. FDI.  Finally, as discussed at length in the Appendix, 
Canada and Singapore were excluded due to the limited significance of the actual patent 
reform undertaken.  This leaves us with 16 countries with sufficient data to estimate the 
impact of reform.  Table II displays the list of patent reforms used in the analysis that 
follows.
25   
Each reform can be classified according to whether or not it expanded or 
strengthened patent rights along five dimensions: 1) an expansion in the range of goods 
eligible for patent protection, 2) an expansion in the effective scope of patent protection, 
3) an increase in the length of patent protection, 4) an improvement in the enforcement of 
patent rights, and 5) an improvement in the administration of the patent system.  There is 
a surprising degree of similarity in the 16 reforms, with 15 out of 16 exhibiting expansion 
of patent rights along at least 4 of the 5 dimensions listed above.  These substantive 
reforms could have a material impact on intrafirm technology transfer and are well-suited 
to the empirical approach outlined in Section 2.  A detailed discussion of the individual 
                                                 
25 To test whether sample selection decisions affect the results, the main tests of the paper have also been 
conducted with a broader sample generated by reducing the affiliate count cutoff from 20 to 10 affiliates 
and including Canadian affiliates of firms in the pharmaceutical and foodstuffs industries.  As indicated in 
the Appendix, some might argue that the 1987 reform in Canada was a meaningful reform in these sectors.  
The main results are robust to using this alternative sample.    15
reform episodes, their distinctive characteristics, and their common features, is also 
provided in the Appendix. 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Technology Transfer to Affiliates  
  To provide a general sense of trends in technology transfer, Figure 1 displays pre- 
and post reform averages of the ratio of aggregate royalties to aggregate sales in each 
country and year.  Each of the unshaded bars illustrates the average pre-reform ratios, and 
the shaded bars illustrate similar averages for the post reform period.  These 
unconditional averages are suggestive of an increase in the value of royalty payments 
relative to sales around the time of IPR reform.  Furthermore, it is clear that affiliates in 
the high patent sample make more extensive use of technology provided by the parent 
and that the ratio of royalty payments to sales increases by the largest amount for this 
sub-sample after reform. 
  Results of regression analyses of royalty payments made by affiliates located in 
the reforming countries to their parents based on specification (1) are reported in Table 
III; standard errors allow for clustering by country.  Columns (1)-(3) report the impact of 
IPR reform on the log of the value of royalty payments to the parent firm.
26  The 
specification in the first column is run on the full sample of affiliates; the coefficient on 
the post reform dummy is positive and significant at the one percent level, indicating that 
intrafirm royalty payments increase at the time of reforms.  As additional regressors, all 
specifications in the table include host country controls, including the corporate income 
                                                 
26   A large number of affiliates, particularly those in low-tech industries, report zero values for technology 
transfer in most years.  We thus added 1 to all observations and took the log of the resulting values.  This 
transformation is standard in the older R&D and productivity literature.  Robustness checks described in 
the text remove affiliates that do not make royalty payments from the sample.    16
tax rate, the withholding tax rate, indicators of FDI restrictions and capital controls, 
measures of openness to trade, and the log of GDP per capita. 
  The specifications in columns (2) and (3) examine the differential effect of IPR 
reform for affiliates of parents that make more extensive use of patents in the U.S.  Since 
these specifications require information on the patent activity of parents, only affiliates of 
firms that can be linked to firms in the NBER patent database are included.  The high 
patent use dummy is equal to one for affiliates of parents that, over the four years prior to 
a particular reform, average at least as many U.S. patent applications as the parent of the 
median affiliate in the reforming country over the same period.  The coefficient on the 
post reform dummy in column (2) is small and insignificantly different from zero, while 
the coefficient on the post reform dummy interacted with the high patent use dummy is 
positive, large, and significant at the one percent level.   
These results imply that the increases in technology transfer as measured by 
royalty payments that occur around the time of IPR reform are concentrated among 
affiliates of parents that use patents extensively.  These affiliates experience an increase 
in royalty payments of about 34 percent.  This is an annual increase in technology flows 
from parent to affiliate which, cumulated over several years, implies a substantial 
increase in the technological intensity of affiliate activity.  Similar results are obtained 
from the specification presented in column (3) that also includes the log of affiliate sales, 
the log of parent R&D expenditures, and the log of parent system sales.  These 
collectively control for the expanding demand for technology of a growing affiliate and    17
the expanding potential supply of technology of a parent as it invests in R&D and 
grows.
27 
  The dependent variable in the specifications presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table 
III is 100 times the log of one plus the ratio of royalty payments to sales.
28  This 
dependent variable is used to assess whether affiliates use technology provided by the 
parent more intensively after reforms occur.  We find results that parallel those reported 
in columns (1)-(3): there is a significant effect of reform on the rate of royalty payments, 
and this effect is concentrated among high patent use firms.  To allow for a more direct 
comparison with the effects reported in columns (1)-(3), it is helpful to calculate the 
elasticity of the royalty to sales ratio with respect to reform.  Defining ratio = 
































where εratio is the elasticity of the royalty to sales ratio with respect to reform.  From 
specification (1), we observe that εratio*ratio is given by β4/100, or 0.0008.  Since the 
mean value of ratio is approximately 0.005, this implies that εratio is approximately 16 
percent.  For the high patent subsample, the implied effect of reform on log(1+ratio), 
based on the last two specifications, is 0.0019, which implies an elasticity of 38 percent.  
                                                 
27   We recognize the potential endogeneity of these variables in this context.  The purpose here is not to 
derive structural estimates of, for instance, affiliate size on technology transfer.  Rather, we only include 
these variables to control for parent specific changes in technology supply and affiliate specific changes in 
technology demand.   
28 This variable is scaled for expositional reasons.    18
These values are roughly comparable to those generated by the level regressions reported 
in columns (1) – (3). 
We subject these results to a number of robustness checks.  To ensure that 
measured responses to reforms do not simply reflect increased reporting of royalties by 
affiliates that face tax incentives to under report royalties prior to reform, we include a 
dummy equal to one if the host country tax rate is below the U.S. tax rate and this dummy 
interacted with the post reform dummy.
29  We include region–year fixed effects in our 
regression using the five regions designated in the BEA data to control for regional 
factors.  We drop all affiliates that report zero licensing payments.  We expand the 
sample to incorporate affiliates in all countries – not just those that underwent reform 
during our sample period.  We also repeat our analyses omitting Argentina and China, the 
countries where we have less confidence that patent reforms were effectively 
implemented.  To address the concern that our results might be driven by pharmaceutical 
firms, we drop all affiliates in that industry.  None of these alternative specifications 
qualitatively change our results. 
4.2 Affiliate R&D Spending 
As discussed in Section 2, affiliate R&D is often focused on the absorption and 
modification of the parent firm’s technology to meet local market conditions and is hence 
a complement to technology imports from the parent.  If IPR reform stimulates an 
increase in the volume of technology deployed, then it should also stimulate an increase 
in affiliate R&D spending.  To examine this hypothesis, the analysis in Table IV 
examines the impact of IPR reform on affiliate R&D activity.  The specifications 
presented parallel those presented in Table III, with the only difference being that the log 
                                                 
29 We also include an interaction of the post reform dummy and the host country withholding tax rate.      19
of affiliate R&D expenditures and 100 times the log of affiliate R&D expenditures scaled 
by sales are used as dependent variables.
30  The results presented in column (1) imply a 
positive effect of IPR reform on the R&D spending of the average affiliate in the full 
sample, but this effect is only significant at the ten percent level.   
The specifications in columns (2) and (3) include the post reform dummy 
interacted with the high patent use dummy to test whether the effects of IPR reform are 
particularly concentrated among firms that make more extensive use of patents in the 
U.S.  The large, positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms imply that 
this is the case.  For instance, the results in column (2) imply that IPR reform leads to a 
23 percent increase in R&D spending by the affiliates of patent-intensive parents, and a t-
test that corrects for clustering at the country level indicates that this increase is 
significantly different from zero at the five percent level.  Because R&D represents a cost 
born by the parent system, the coincidence of the measured increase in R&D spending 
with the measured increase in royalty payments suggests that at least some component of 
the latter represents a real increase in the deployment of technology to affiliates.  
Columns (4)-(6) of Table IV provide the results of specifications in which R&D 
expenditure is scaled by affiliate sales.  The results parallel those for the unscaled 
regressions: R&D intensity increases significantly among patent intensive firms.   
We test the robustness of these results on affiliate R&D spending in a number of 
alternative specifications.  We incorporate region–year fixed effects into our 
specification.  We drop observations for affiliates that report zero R&D spending.  We 
                                                 
30 It is important to make two caveats about the R&D data.  First, data on affiliate R&D expenditures were 
not collected from 1983-1988 so the sample does not include data from these years.  Second, since many 
affiliates report zero values for R&D expenditures in most years, we add 1 to all observations of affiliate 
R&D and affiliate R&D scaled by sales and took the log of the resulting values.  Robustness checks 
described in the text remove affiliates that do not conduct R&D from the sample.    20
expand the sample to include all available countries, not just those undergoing IPR 
reform over our sample period.  We remove Japan from the sample, since it is the one 
country where affiliate R&D is not primarily focused on absorption and adaptation of the 
parent firms’ technology.  None of these alternative specifications qualitatively changed 
our results. 
4.3 Resident versus Non-Resident Patenting 
  Figure 2 illustrates the patterns in patent filings by foreigners and domestic 
residents before and after IPR reform, comparing ratios of patent filings in the years 
around the time of reform to the level recorded in the year immediately preceding patent 
reform.  This figure suggests that, relative to the pre-reform period, patenting grows for 
non-residents after reform, while remaining flat for domestic residents. This pattern is 
broadly consistent with the findings of Lerner (2002a, 2002b).  It also implies that at least 
one component of the observed increase in licensing payments is connected to an 
increase in the volume of technology transferred.   
The analysis presented in Table V measures the impact of IPR reform on patent 
filings by both domestic and foreign innovators.  We regress the log of the counts of 
patent filings (resident or non-resident) on a post reform dummy, an interaction term 
between the post reform dummy and a time trend that measures the number of years that 
have passed since the reform year, country and year fixed effects, country-specific time 
trends, and the same country level controls used in the previous tables.  Columns (1) and 
(2) present specifications in which the dependent variable is the log of resident patent 
filings.  In column (1), the coefficient on the post reform dummy is indistinguishable 
from zero, indicating that resident patent filings do not increase when reforms occur.     21
Column (2) shows that the post reform dummy interacted with the time trend is also 
insignificant, indicating that the resident patent filings do not grow after reforms.   
  Columns (3) and (4) present similar specifications for non-resident patent filings.  
There is robust evidence that these filings increase and continue to grow after reforms.  
The coefficient on the post reform dummy in column (3) implies an increase in non-
resident filings of about 52 percent.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the post reform dummy interacted with the time trend in column (4) implies that the 
number of non-resident filings grows more rapidly after reforms.  This evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that multinationals do not just patent technologies that had 
been used prior to reforms but also transfer new technologies to reforming countries. 
4.4   Endogeneity and Timing of Reforms 
Our estimation strategy treats the timing of IPR reform in a given country as 
exogenous, at least with respect to the activities of U.S.-based multinational firms and 
their affiliates.  It may be that other changes that are coincident with patent reform drive 
both the changes in the patent regime and the measured changes in affiliate behavior.  For 
example, once a nation reaches a certain threshold level of development, internal and 
external pressure may build for a stronger patent system.  Alternatively, pressure by U.S. 
multinationals (exerted indirectly via the U.S. government) may cause countries to adopt 
reforms when companies have a need to increase technology transfer.   
While we cannot completely rule out these alternative explanations, we can 
examine their plausibility more carefully.  First, many explanations related to coincident 
changes and reverse causation predict that technology transfer begins to increase in the 
years prior to the date of reform.  The specifications displayed in Table VI provide more    22
detailed estimates of the timing of changes in affiliate royalty payments, affiliate R&D 
expenditures, and non-resident patent filings.  These specifications are similar to those 
described above, but they do not include country-specific time trends, and they yield 
coefficient estimates for a set of dummy variables that correspond to periods of fixed 
length before and after reform.  The Reform (t-4) dummy is equal to one for all years that 
predate the reform by four or more years and is equal to zero in all other years, and the 
Reform (t+4) dummy is equal to one for all years at least four years after reform and zero 
during other years.  The other reform dummies are equal to one in specific years relative 
to reform and zero during other years.  There is no dummy for the year immediately 
preceding reform (i.e., year t-1); the coefficients on the reform dummies provide 
estimates relative to that year.   
Columns (1) and (2) present specifications using royalty payments and scaled 
royalty payments respectively as the dependent variable.  The results indicate that while 
the coefficients on the dummies for years prior to reform are negative, they are all 
insignificant and fail to show any evidence of a clear upward trend prior to reform.  The 
coefficients on the dummies for the year of reform are positive but insignificant, and the 
dummies for the years after reform are large, positive, and significant.  Thus, the 
estimated timing of changes is consistent with a shift in activities that follows soon after 
the enactment of reform.  A fairly rapid reaction is reasonable.  Our sample of U.S. 
multinationals includes firms that possess a portfolio of technologies employed around 
the world and that are familiar with strong patent system environments.  While 
indigenous firms might require some time to adjust to a strong IPR regime with which 
they have no previous experience, it is plausible that our U.S. multinationals could    23
respond quickly, redeploying their existing technologies to take advantage of 
opportunities created by the new regime.   
Column (3) presents results of a specification using the log of affiliate R&D 
expenditures as the dependent variable.  Again, there is no clear upward trend prior to 
reforms and the post reform coefficients are, with one exception, larger than the pre-
reform coefficients.  The post reform coefficients are jointly significant and suggest a 
substantial post reform increase in R&D spending, though the relationship between patent 
reform and the timing of measured changes in affiliate activity does not appear to be as 
clear as it is for technology transfer.
31  The dependent variable in the specification in 
column (4) is the log of non-resident patent filings.  As suggested by the pattern in Figure 
4, there is an increase in patent filings precisely timed to our reform dates, and these 
filings continue to grow once reforms take place. 
Several other considerations also help to ease concerns about the endogeneity of 
IPR reform.  First, it is clear from a casual look at the wide divergence in per-capita 
income among the IPR reforming countries in our sample that these countries were at 
very different levels of economic development at the time of reform.  It is therefore very 
unlikely that these countries were reaching a common development threshold at the time 
of their IPR reform.   
The argument that reforms were driven by the desire of U.S. multinationals to 
obtain advantages in reforming markets is premised on the assumption that these firms 
developed a list of lucrative potential markets, and pushed the U.S. government to apply 
diplomatic pressure on selected countries at precisely the time that they wished to 
                                                 
31 This may be a consequence of the nature of the affiliate R&D data since these data were not collected 
from 1983-1988. Given that a number of reforms occur during this period, obtaining precise estimates of 
effects in years relative to reform years is difficult.    24
increase technology transfer.  Econometric evidence, derived from a unique feature of 
U.S. trade law, casts doubt on the possibility that U.S. multinationals were able to 
effectively control the timing of reform to their advantage.  Since the passage of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the U.S. government has been required 
by law to identify nations that violate the intellectual property rights of U.S. firms.  In 
accordance with this requirement, every year the United States announces a “Special 301 
Watch List” and a “Special 301 Priority Watch List” of nations in which violations are 
deemed to be especially injurious and where changes in the national IPR environment are 
a U.S. diplomatic priority.   For reforms after 1988, we estimated hazard models of the 
timing of IPR reform using the presence of a country on one of these lists as an 
explanatory variable.  This variable had no statistically significant explanatory power in 
our regressions.
32  Hence, the timing of reforms is not correlated with this measure of 
U.S. diplomatic pressure. 
This econometric result is consistent with the historical accounts of Ryan (1996) 
and Uphoff (1990), and with our own interviews with multinational managers and 
resident legal experts in the reforming countries.  All of these sources indicate that US 
pressure interacted in complicated ways with domestic counter pressure, and this 
interaction introduced an element of randomness into the timing of reforms that is 
exogenous to the wishes of U.S. multinationals.
33   
5. Conclusion 
                                                 
32 These regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
33 Further evidence of America’s lack of diplomatic omnipotence is provided by the timing of other reforms 
that multinationals would obviously have an interest in promoting – such as a lifting of FDI restrictions and 
an expansion of openness to trade.  In most cases, these other reforms were not coincident with patent 
reform.     25
Over the past 20 years, the international economic policy agenda has increasingly 
taken the enactment of strong, globally enforced intellectual property rights as a priority.  
This represents a significant departure for international economic policy, and it remains 
deeply controversial.  Advocates of stronger IPR have asserted, with little evidence, that 
stronger IPR will yield benefits by inducing multinational firms to engage in more 
technology transfer.  This paper empirically tests that hypothesis by analyzing the effects 
of reform on the royalty payments and R&D expenditures of U.S. multinational affiliates, 
as well as the level and growth rate of patent filings by non-residents, and finds that all of 
these increase following reforms.  Increases in affiliate royalties and R&D are 
concentrated among affiliates of firms that make extensive use of the U.S. patent system 
prior to reforms and are therefore likely to value reforms the most.  For these patent 
intensive firms, we estimate that increases in affiliate royalties exceed 30 percent.  Our 
results collectively imply that U.S. multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes 
abroad by significantly increasing technology transfer to reforming countries.   
These results are not, of course, sufficient to demonstrate that IPR reform is 
welfare enhancing for reforming countries.  The analysis does not consider the impact of 
reforms on locally owned firms that may be displaced after reforms nor does it examine 
the effects of the reforms on the pace of innovation in non-reforming countries.  
However, given the limited evidence that IPR reform spurs domestic innovation, 
increases in technology transfer are likely to be a necessary condition for IPR reform to 
increase welfare in reforming countries.  Our results suggest that for at least one type of 
transfer, international technology transfer with multinational firms, this condition is met. 
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Year Relative to Reform
Non-Resident Patent Filings
Resident Patent FilingsFull Sample
1982 1989 1994 1999 1982-1999
Number of Affiliates 3,970                4,115                4,888                5,785                12,961             
Number of Parents 836                   902                   1,114                1,132                2,156               
Intrafirm Royalty Payments
    Mean 157                   552                   932                   988                   997                  
    Standard Deviation 2,335                13,873              14,989              14,870              16,622             
R&D Expenditures
    Mean 117                   407                   482                   570                   635                  
    Standard Deviation 911                   9,470                4,397                6,595                6,538               
Sales
    Mean 57,129              77,604              90,229              106,866            115,406           
    Standard Deviation 299,376            460,023            517,553            463,536            534,787           
Parent R&D Expenditures
    Mean 80,836              81,805              72,647              94,310              109,491           
    Standard Deviation 282,188            358,908            338,329            392,521            398,687           
Parent System Sales
    Mean 3,262,647         3,940,225         4,151,990         6,007,838         5,512,638        
    Standard Deviation 9,552,341         11,500,000       13,100,000       17,300,000       14,800,000      
Number of Non-Resident Patent Filings
    Mean 4,669                8,276                13,953              41,482              13,761             
    Standard Deviation 7,035                12,281              15,488              29,231              18,543             
Number of Resident Patent Filings
    Mean 19,805              23,973              26,239              33,896              26,461             
    Standard Deviation 63,383              84,541              84,956              99,531              83,687             
Mean St. Dev
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 0.3375 0.1309
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 0.0707 0.0889
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.0661 0.2485
Host Country Capital Controls 0.1125 0.3160
Host Country Trade Openness 36.7459 22.8795
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 8.9843 0.6759
Descriptive Statistics for all Affiliate Years
Table I
Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Multinational Activity in Reforming Countries
Benchmark Years
The top panel provides descriptive statistics for the data obtained from BEA surveys and from WIPO.  Intrafirm royalty payments are royalty payments 
made by affiliates to their parents and like the other financial data are measured in thousands of dollars.  Parent R&D Expenditures are the R&D 
expenditures of the domestic operations of the parent.  Parent System Sales are the total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  The Number of Non-Resident 
Patent Filings and the Number of Resident Patent Filings are counts of patent applications by non-residents and residents in a particular country and year.  
The bottom panel provides descriptive statistics for the country level control variables that are used in the analysis.  The Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 
and the Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and
Host Country Capital Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) 
and Shatz (2000), respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  

















This table provides information about the timing of reforms in the countries that strengthen their 
intellectual property rights and are included in the sample.
Timing of Major Patent Reforms
Table IIDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.2650 16.5317 37.9012 -4.9088 -8.6826 -4.3862
(33.9656) (48.1874) (49.8304) (18.4389) (30.9809) (30.6403)
Post Reform Dummy 0.1663 -0.0006 -0.0080 0.0788 -0.0095 -0.0025
(0.0619) (0.0856) (0.0872) (0.0333) (0.0448) (0.0459)
0.3362 0.3107 0.2043 0.1866
(0.0850) (0.1004) (0.0483) (0.0519)
-0.0625 0.2083 0.0612 -0.0726 -0.0672 -0.1058
(0.4482) (0.5273) (0.5753) (0.1893) (0.2491) (0.2544)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate -0.1815 0.4360 0.3218 -0.3515 -0.3652 -0.3844
(0.5124) (0.7530) (0.7408) (0.3397) (0.4438) (0.4512)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.0644 -0.0470 -0.0514 0.0399 0.0342 0.0337
(0.0445) (0.1436) (0.1387) (0.0359) (0.1243) (0.1220)
Host Country Capital Controls -0.2561 -0.4771 -0.4662 -0.0587 -0.1083 -0.1094
(0.1163) (0.1287) (0.1454) (0.0453) (0.0359) (0.0385)
Host Country Trade Openness -0.0053 -0.0172 -0.0176 -0.0048 -0.0125 -0.0121
(0.0043) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0031) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 1.2070 1.8739 1.8584 0.5165 0.6821 0.7196
(0.3213) (0.4770) (0.5060) (0.1472) (0.2754) (0.2917)
Log of Affiliate Sales 0.0976
(0.0342)
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 0.0272 0.0121
(0.0126) (0.0035)
Log of Parent System Sales 0.0296 -0.0131
(0.0428) (0.0256)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Country-Specific Time Trends? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 52,067         18,401         17,737         49,970         18,029         17,384        
R-Squared 0.7408 0.7149 0.7155 0.6763 0.6751 0.6750
Table III
Intrafirm Royalty Payments and IPR Regime Changes
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the log of one plus the value of royalty payments made by affiliates to their parents, and the dependen
variable in columns 4-6 is the log of one plus the ratio of intrafirm royalty payments to affiliate sales, multiplied by 100.  The Post Reform Dummy is a 
dummy equal to one in the year of reform and in the years following the reforms identified in Table II.  The High Patent Use Dummy is a dummy that is 
equal to one for affiliates of parents that over the four years prior to a reform average at least as many patent applications as the parent of the median 
affiliate in the reforming country.  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by 
affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI 
restrictions and capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000), respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the index 
of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from data
provided in the World Bank World Development Indicators (2003).  Log of Affiliate Sales is the log of the value of affiliate sales, and Log of Parent 
R&D Expenditures is the log of the affiliate's parent R&D expenditures.  The Log of Parent System Sales is the log of total sales of the parent and its 
affiliates.  All specifications include affiliate and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
that correct for clustering at the country level appear in parentheses.
Log of Intrafirm Royalty Payments
100 X Log of Intrafirm Royalty 
Payments/Affiliate Sales
Post Reform Dummy * High Patent Use 
Dummy
Host Country Corporate Tax RateDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -22.5850 -14.5488 -17.7987 -11.3471 -6.3190 -6.4074
(32.8691) (53.1728) (51.2915) (12.0184) (18.5573) (18.5184)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0908 -0.1079 -0.1277 0.0049 -0.0716 -0.0704
(0.0512) (0.1153) (0.1191) (0.0257) (0.0475) (0.0474)
0.3374 0.3250 0.1058 0.1026
(0.1507) (0.1510) (0.0522) (0.0516)
0.8715 0.5898 0.4829 0.3968 0.1047 0.1041
(0.3201) (0.4738) (0.4745) (0.2189) (0.1553) (0.1547)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 1.1364 0.1351 0.0504 0.5258 0.1642 0.1632
(0.3461) (0.7787) (0.8027) (0.2757) (0.3073) (0.3058)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.0506 0.0234 0.0235 -0.0528 -0.0899 -0.0902
(0.0573) (0.1388) (0.1402) (0.0179) (0.0330) (0.0333)
Host Country Capital Controls -0.1948 -0.2725 -0.2613 -0.0145 -0.0479 -0.0476
(0.0932) (0.1243) (0.1196) (0.0268) (0.0230) (0.0226)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0058 0.0073 0.0076 0.0022 0.0024 0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 0.1796 -0.2321 -0.4775 0.0050 -0.0103 -0.0089
(0.4405) (0.6959) (0.7283) (0.0983) (0.1937) (0.1935)
Log of Affiliate Sales 0.1352
(0.0412)
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 0.0311 0.0074
(0.0096) (0.0024)
Log of Parent System Sales -0.0645 -0.0029
(0.0305) (0.0053)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Country-Specific Time Trends? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 31,739         10,238         10,238         31,588         10,182         10,182        
R-Squared 0.7310 0.6838 0.6858 0.6684 0.6710 0.6710
Table IV
Affiliate R&D Expenses and IPR Regime Changes
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the log of one plus the value of affiliate R&D expenditures, and the dependent variable in columns 4-6
is the log of one plus the ratio of affiliate R&D expenditures to affiliate sales, multiplied by 100.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in 
the year of reform and in the years following the reforms identified in Table II.  The High Patent Use Dummy is a dummy that is equal to one for 
affiliates of parents that over the four years prior to a reform average at least as many patent applications as the parent of the median affiliate in the 
reforming country.  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host 
country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and capital 
controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000), respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price 
openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from data provided in the
World Bank World Development Indicators (2003).  Log of Affiliate Sales is the log of the value of affiliate sales, and Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 
is the log of the affiliate's parent R&D expenditures.  The Log of Parent System Sales is the log of total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  All 
specifications include affiliate and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for 
clustering at the country level appear in parentheses.
Log of R&D Expenditures
100 X Log of R&D 
Expenditures/Affiliate Sales
Post Reform Dummy * High Patent Use 
Dummy
Host Country Corporate Tax RateDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -3.7953 12.7808 -20.0926 39.1461
(46.6012) (50.1311) (78.3782) (81.7430)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0216 0.0563 0.5232 0.6425
(0.1792) (0.1832) (0.1955) (0.2172)
0.0564 0.1968
(0.0820) (0.0846)
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 1.1227 1.1212 -0.7735 -0.7643
(0.6728) (0.6755) (0.7756) (0.6524)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate -0.5192 -0.2306 -0.1672 0.8723
(1.2679) (1.3648) (1.0045) (1.1015)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.7533 0.7749 -0.0646 0.0031
(0.3344) (0.3529) (0.1641) (0.1696)
Host Country Capital Controls 0.0032 -0.0374 -0.0150 -0.1528
(0.1210) (0.1322) (0.1349) (0.1533)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0030 0.0061 0.0172 0.0263
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0136)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita -1.0645 -1.1958 0.1481 -0.2200
(0.6728) (0.6851) (1.5014) (1.4581)
Country and Year Fixed Effects? YYYY
Country-Specific Time Trends? YYYY
No. of Obs. 223                  223                  226                  226                 
R-Squared 0.9600 0.9600 0.9696 0.9723
Post Reform Dummy * Number of Years 
Since Reform
Log of Resident Patent Filings
Log of Non-Resident Patent 
Filings
Table V
Host Country Patenting Activity and IPR Regime Changes
The dependent variable in the first two specifications is the log of the number of patents filed in a particular country by residents 
of that country, and the dependent variable in the last two specifications is the log of the number of patents filed in a particular 
country by non-residents.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in the year of reform and the years following the 
reforms identified in Table II.  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax 
rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummies 
equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000), 
respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from data provided in the World Bank  World Development 
Indicators (2003).  All specifications include country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.  
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the country level appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -2.0441 0.7016 -0.8979 0.8188
(2.3708) (1.6815) (2.0430) (4.7270)
Reform(t-4) -0.0780 -0.0305 -0.0147 -0.2616
(0.1048) (0.0569) (0.0777) (0.1801)
Reform(t-3) -0.1139 -0.0195 0.0842 -0.0541
(0.1036) (0.0552) (0.0667) (0.1041)
Reform(t-2) -0.0638 -0.0199 0.0802 -0.0105
(0.0319) (0.0254) (0.0358) (0.1015)
Reform(t) 0.0432 0.0267 0.1509 0.2272
(0.0560) (0.0280) (0.0368) (0.1024)
Reform(t+1) 0.1265 0.0835 0.1145 0.7052
(0.0403) (0.0296) (0.0577) (0.2646)
Reform(t+2) 0.2172 0.1196 0.1639 0.6654
(0.0631) (0.0362) (0.0827) (0.2948)
Reform(t+3) 0.1990 0.1561 0.0475 0.6764
(0.0745) (0.0475) (0.1050) (0.2864)
Reform(t+4) 0.2261 0.1480 0.2093 0.7309
(0.1160) (0.0827) (0.1234) (0.2681)
Controls? YYYY
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYYN
Country and Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y
No. of Obs. 52,067       49,970       31,739       226          
R-Squared 0.7387 0.6746 0.7307 0.9410
Log of Non-Resident Patent 
Filings
The dependent variable in the first column is the log of one plus the value of royalty payments made by affiliates to their parents; the dependent variable in the second column is the log of one plus the ratio of intrafirm 
royalty payments to affiliate sales, multiplied by 100; the dependent variable in the third column is the log of one plus the value of affiliate R&D expenditures; and the dependent variable in the last specification is the 
log of the number of patents filed in a particular country by non-residents.  Reform (t-4) is a dummy that is equal to one for observations from four or more years before a reform.  Reform(t+4) is equal to one for 
observations from four or more years after a reform.  Other reform dummies are equal to one in particular years relative to reform.  As controls, each specification includes the Host Country Corporate Tax Rate, Host 
Country Withholding Tax Rate, Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions, Host Country Capital Controls, Host Country Trade Openness, and the Log of Host Country GDP per Capita.  Specifications (1)-(3) include 
affiliate and year fixed effects, and specification (4) includes country and year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the country level appear in parenthese
Timing of reforms
Table VI
Log of Intrafirm Royalty 
Payments
100 X Log of Intrafirm Royalty 
Payments/Affiliate Sales
Log of R&D Expenditures